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Decision theory extends probability theory to guide decisionmaking under u n m . Utilities are used to provide a quantitative measure of preferences among possible world states To decide among altcmatin actions, the expected utility of each alternative is calculated by taking the sum of the utilities of all possible future states ofthe world that follow from that alIernative, weighted by the probabilities of those states ocnming. Decision theory holds that a rational agent c b w r s the altemative that maximizes the expectsd utility. A belief nenvork, which consists entirely of chance nodes, can be extended into a decision network (equivalently, an influmce diagram) by adding decision and utility ncdes along with appmpriae a m . A dynamic decision network @DN) is like a DEN except that it bas decision and utility nodes in addition to chance nodes. DDNs mcdel decisions for siNations in which decisions, variables or preferences can change over time. [14] , relevant infoxmation 8, of a set of assertions 8 and a query Q (possibly a set of queries) can be d e h e d as the minimal subset of -9 such that the q w y Q follows from 8 if it follows from 8, Moreover, B probabilistic detinition of i m l C V a n C C rrquires that for all 0 " l c O m s Of the query Q, the probability of the query given e and ( 3 , remains the same. In other variables) e and an action ab the degra of relevance 6 of 6 at time r, with r e m to a, at time f. can be defined as the smallest 6 that satisfies the inequality: ptil(a,, I 6, )-Uti/(,, 1 + 1 ,) 1 s 6.
If 6, or -3 contain disjunctions of mutuaily exclusive outcomes sucb as the distinct values of variables in 6, are not binary, it is more eficient and convenient to perform painvise comparisons of eacb two of these outcomes. Hence, we extend the definition of relevance to use pinuise comparisons as follows:
Defiifion-2, The deof relevance of factor 3 with rrspcct to action a, is 6 iff for all possible assignments of 3, the maxhnum change in the utility Uti/(a, 13) is less than 6.
In the above dehition, Gnpmcnts the smngth of the d e w of relevana. Since OUT intmst w in wzak temporal relevance with reasonably small 6 values, we will give another definition that allow us to ignore very weak relevance:
Def;ririon 3. The theory Bcan be dividcd into a relevant subset and an extranwu? subset 6. In this study of irnlevance, our goal it to identify the imlcvant i n f o d o n and define the relevant subthmty ei, By prcciscly iden-g it is possible to improve thc performancc of intelligent ~ystcms by r a d u c i the sizc of the knowledgebase that must be considexed bebre amvexing mS quny. 
m. AN WPUI BOUND FUR I'MB SUCBD DECISION NETWORKS

T h e m
In a time sliced decision network, consider a fluent Cj with states C, and -Cj and the four transition probabilities: P(-C,*, I C,) = PI * P(C,+, I -C l ) = P2, P(C,+, IC,) = 1 -A. and P(-C,+, I TCJ = 1 -A sucb that 0 < p,,p, e 1 . If the system is in state C, then the fluent is m e at time i. Let the utility of the decision D at time I is U, (D) and let the probability of the fluent is in state C, at tin& I be P(C,). We claim that for any 6 (< 1, there exists T such that 
Intuitively, this theorem implies that information at a particular time may not help in taking a decision at another later time if the period between the two is long enwgh. Here, Stationarity is a wnumn assumption in h4arkov decision proecssa This assumption implies that the pmbability distribution and rcwards do not change with time. Consequently. if we only have evidencc at ta the utilities will be either monotonically inmasing a mttotonicaUy decreasing with timc d i n g to the qualitative probability model in 1151. Given that the utilities U@lCd and U@l-Cd convergeand so do the utilities U,-DlCd and U,-Dl-Cd, we have all four utilities monotonically cvohing over tiw. lbey can all be evolving in the Mori (e.g. all increasing) or they may evolve m different d k t i o n s (e.g. the inmasing and one decrsasing). Here, we examine thrse examples to illuswte the convergence behavia of decisions with respect to t b t of utilities. It is obvious that whenever utilities converge, the decision also mnvergcs becaw typically, a rational agent selects the decision that madmivs the expected utility.
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Example 1.
First assume that U,@lCd and U@[-Cd are both monotonically inmasing while U/-DlCd and U,;Dl-Cd are monotonically derreasiog. ?lis situation is depicted m Figure 2 . H a we can m that decision convcrgesbehvesn t i m e slices 8 and 9; also notice that the utility converges between time slices 18 and 19. So clearly, decision c o n v w faster than utility in this case To summarize, most of the time, decision converges faster than utility, but not necessarily. Section VI presents some test results to verify the validity of an empirical generaliration of the theorem in Section III to general dynamic decision networks
V. EMPWCAL GwERl\LlZATlON
The analytical bound on infomation relevame in dynamic decision networks derived in Section 111 describes the behavior of a single variable sptem Applying the analytical approach used in Section 111 to gencralkd n e t w o h results in complex rcamence relations that do not lend themelves to anatytical solutions To generalize the result in Section III M adopt an empirical approach. The present work is somewllat related to the study of the cutoff phenomnon in Markov chains. This phenomon characterized by the rather sudden and fast convergeme of some chaim after a ceriain time continues to be rn ana of mathematical rescarch since it was intmduced in [3]. Mathematicians have developed bounds on the convergence of mdom walks, diffusion models. card shuffles ..., etc.
The present study adopts a more hemistic, computationally efficient and empirical amroach to the problem To find a general upper limit on relevance time, let us consider the The notation M&iVj represents the maximum diffennce in the utility table and Mar(dP) represnts the maximum difference in any conditional probability table associated with a temporal edge.
To assess the quality of this measure, we have conducted extensive experimenml evaluation and the initial results are promising.
VI. E X P E R h m u n U EVALUATION We have conducted several sets of experiments using five dynamic decision network models, namely Genetic, Weather Forecart, Car Sales, POMDP and T i m Critical. The generic network shown io Figwe 1 has been used to study the behavior of multivalued networks. In these networks each o d e has more than two values. The weather network shown in Figure 5 represents two slices of this network that is slightly more complex than the genetic network as the decision node (umbrella) depends on two nods (forecast and weather). The c a r sales network extends the network in [Z] by including a decision node,representing the profit margin and a utility node representing the net gains 7his network has four chance nods in each time slice representing price, supply, demand, and state of the economy. Temporal edges connect supply nodes and the state of economy nodes. Figure 6 shows a time slice of this network The POMPD network represents a panially In each set of experiments, we use several thousands of randomly generated dynamic decision networks as indicated in Table I and  Table 2 . These test networks use randomly gengated conditional probabilities and utilities. The random values are checked to eliminate inconsistent networks including networlts that have utilities that differ by values smaller than the chosen 6. All ponsible observations are set as evidence at time rem, one at a t h e , and propagated ?e evaluation algorithm kgps Wck of the paimisC differences m utilities &e to different initial evidence. The algorithm reports the relevance time by coqaring these painUise differences to 6.
In the following discussion, the pmposed predictor is considered to have underestimated or u n d e r -p r d d the relevance time if the predicted time is shorter than the achal time.
As we have mentioned prenausly, the wmplexity of decision network reasoning is in general NP-hard So is the complexity of reasoning in DDNs. Since we use a shaightfonvard implementation of DDNs, we have to limit our cxpsrimmts in the following manner. When calculating the actual bound, wc only allow a DDN to have up to C time slices, where C is a variable that depemis on the nature of the network modcl under consideration. For the lan thne sets of exprriments, we used the Generic network, but this t i m e instead of being saictly binary valued, the variables that we used ate multivalued Unfortunately. wben nmre values arc allowed, the general formula under-predicts in sam cases. However, under-pdiction occurred for less than 4% of all tests. Moreover, in the cases where the bound is exceeded, it wds exceeded by a small numbn of steps. Hence, the formula might still be useful in situations where absolute m i n t y is not required. Since almost all the undetprediaions were off by 7 or less time slices, a 'slush factor' can be added to the result of the formula to guaranty zero underestimation.
The WeatberNerwork~dcl~=O.~l~ Table 3 . As expected, in m s t cases, decision converges faster than utilities. Hae we used the Gennic network with binary valued nodes. Figure 9 shows the performance of the predicted bound for h e W e a h r Forecast network (when delta=0.001 and the variables are binary). 
